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Reorganization trustees play a crucial role in bankruptcy procedure. The trustees try to resurrect
deteriorating businesses by managing remaining resources for the benefit of beneficiaries, usually
unsecured creditors, and shareholders. More or less, a trustee's role is similar to that of the officers
or managers of a solvent company. Fiduciary duty arises between the residual claimers and the
stakeholders on one hand, and the operator and the trustee on the other hand. Astonishingly, under
current U.S. bankruptcy law, the reorganization trustee's fiduciary duty is not well defined, al-
though this duty has been widely litigated. The vagueness is primarily due to misinterpretation of
the Mosser case, adjudicated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Fortunately, multitudes of academic
literature on fiduciary duty in corporate law explain the application issues and clarify the vagueness
of trustee fiduciary duty. But fiduciary duty is highly context-specific. Corporate fiduciary duty
cannot be arbitrarily applied to the bankruptcy context without necessary modification.
In China, the unclear definition of the trustee fiduciary duty has greatly dampened the efficacy of
the reorganization mechanism of the new bankruptcy law. Given the pressures of the current
global financial crisis, it is imperative to amend the duty so it is more viable and practical. Given
that the current Chinese reorganization mechanism is transplanted from U.S. bankruptcy regula-
tion, retrospection to its origin is helpful in improving the trustee fiduciary duty. This article also
explores the use of the case directive to facilitate the adaptation and increase the flexibility of such
duty in practice.
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I. Introduction
Reorganization' is a tool that permits insolvent corporations to enter into a debt re-
structuring process and avoids liquidation of the firm's assets.? The bankruptcy court
oversees this process. During reorganization, a trustee may be appointed to operate and
financially restructure the firm.3 Since the restructuring process involves decisions that
substantially change the rights of the various stakeholders, the trustee's actions are subject
to much scrutiny.4 Creditors and shareholders are seldom pleased with the decisions of
the trustee, because the insolvent firms tend to continue to flounder.s Even when the
trustee's business decisions are logical and well thought out, many stakeholders feel as
1. For the simplicity and continuity of this article, the author will use "reorganization" and "trustee"
rather than "Chapter 11 case" and "Chapter II trustee" respectively. When the author mentions reorganiza-
non and trustee for U.S. bankruptcy law, it has the same meaning as the case in Chapter 11.
2. BLACK's LAW DicTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (Westlaw).
3. See Clifford J. White n & Walter W. Theus, Jr., Chapter 11 Trustees and EraminersAfter BAPCPA, 80
Am. BANKIR. L.J. 289, 305-06 (2006) (noting it is impossible to have a debtor in possession (DIP) and a trustee
in one reorganization case simultaneously).
4. See WILLIAM D. WARREN & DANIEL J. BUSSEL, BANKRUPTcy 568-88 (8th ed. 2009).
5. Steven A. Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 U. DAYTON L. REv. 81, 94-95 (2009).
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though their rights have been violated. 6 This dissatisfaction often leads to stakeholder
litigation. A popular cause of action is negligence in breach of the fiduciary duty of care.7
In the United States, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005 (BAPCPA) is believed to have led to a high frequency of trustee appointments.8
Unfortunately, BAPCPA is silent on the trustee's liability for breach of duty of care, creat-
ing uncertainty for the stakeholders of the insolvent firm.9 The courts have attempted to
balance the interests of the trustees with that of the creditors and shareholders,' 0 but the
courts have not been uniform in the standard of review applicable to this breach." A
handful of circuit courts have found trustees personally liable for negligence, while other
courts have held that trustees should not be subjected to personal liability unless they are
found to have acted with heightened negligence, with recklessness, or fraud.12 The U.S.
Supreme Court has not provided any guidance on the subject, remaining silent on the
issue.13 But, many have found partial guidance from Mosserv. Darroz,14 heard by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1951.1s
At the other end of the earth, China continues to dismantle its inefficient economic
systems formed in an earlier time under its "Planned Economy."' 6 The Law of the Peo-
6. See David P. Primack, Confusion and Solution: Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Trustee's Standard of Care for Per-
sonal Liability, 43 WM. & MARY L. Riw. 1297, 1312 (2002) (talking about the tension trustees are facing in
reorganization cases); see also DiStefano v. Stern, 223 B.R. 610, 628 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998), affd, 236 B.R.
112 (D. Mass. 1999), affd, 215 F.3d 1312 (1st Cir. 2000).
7. See Primack, supra note 6, at 1309.
8. See White & Theus, supra note 3, at 297-98 (the authors believe that the significant modifications of
section 1104 will invite more Chapter 11 trustee appointments by offering judges more latitude in making
appointment decisions).
9. Dodson v. Huff (In re Smyth), 207 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 2000); Hutchinson v. McGee, 5 F.3d 750,
752 (4th Cir. 1993); see also David W. Allard, Personal Liability of Tusteesand Debtors in Possession: Review of the
Vatying Standards of Care in the United States, 106 Com. LJ. 415, 416 (2001).
10. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 274 (1951).
11. Dodson, 207 F.3d at 761.
12. See Allard, supra note 9, at 416; see also Dodson, 207 F.3d at 763; In re Chi. Pac. Corp., 773 F.2d 909,
917-18 (7th Cir. 1985); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Weaver, 680 F.2d 451, 461-62 (6th Cir. 1982); Boullion v.
McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cir. 1981); Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.2d 1367, 1374 (10th Cir. 1977);
Smallwood v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Mo. 1973), affd, 486 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973) (these
courts don't follow the six other circuits, which found personal liability for mere negligence).
13. Allard, supra note 9, at 428-29.
14. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 274-75.
15. See Daniel B. Bogart, Finding the Still Small Voice: The Liability ofBankruptcy Trustees and the Work ofthe
National Bankruptcy Review Commission, 102 DICK. L. REv. 703, 710-11 (1998); see also Primack, supra note 6,
at 1312; Allard, supra note 9, at 428-29; Ralph C. McCullough, Trustee Liability: Is There Enough Protection for
These "Arms of the Court?", 103 Com. LJ. 123, 123 (1998).
16. See ARNALDo M. GONCALVES, CHINA'S SWING FROM A PLANNED SOVIET-TYPE EcONOMY TO AN
INGENIOUS SOCIALIST MARKEfT ECONOMY: AN AccouNT OF 50 YFARs 36 (2006), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=949371 (discussing the transformation from a planned economy to a market economy in
China). "Planned economy" is an economic system in which the government controls the economy. Its most
extensive form is referred to as a "command economy," "centrally planned economy," or "command and
control economy." Under such a system, "resource prices are in many cases distorted, failing to reflect the
real value, as many types of resources are still priced by the state, operating on the inertia of the old planned
economy." Id. at 31.
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ple's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy of 2005 (New Bankruptcy Law)' 7 is
regarded as a great leap forward in Chinese corporate legislation, and is expected to facili-
tate China's reform of its economic system through standardization of the market-exit
mechanism.18 Before 2005, two laws regulated bankruptcy: Chapter XIX Procedure for
Bankruptcy and Debt Repayment of Legal Person Enterprises (the Chapter X[X)19 and
the Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy for Trial Implemen-
tation (Trial Implementation Law).20
Many Chinese lawyers and practitioners anxiously awaited the New Bankruptcy Law, as
the then-current laws failed to regulate the bankruptcy of organizational entities such as
education and partnership enterprises. 2 1 In 2005, the New Bankruptcy Law was promul-
gated and is now applicable to any type of business organization. 2 2 Major components of
the new law include reorganization and a "bankruptcy administrator" (Po Chan Guan Li
Ren, hereinafter "trustee"),2 3 transplanted from the West. 24 However, two years after its
proclamation, legal professionals have found the New Bankruptcy Law lacking as it does
not properly address the trustee's liability. 25
Article 27 of the New Bankruptcy Law stipulates, "[a] bankruptcy administrator shall be
diligent and dutiful, and shall faithfully perform its duties." 26 The specific duties are enu-
17. See Zh6ng hui ren min gsng h6 guo qi y6 po chan fa, ( A ~ll5REiM) [Law on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (China)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective
June 1, 2007), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-08/28/content_371296.htm.
18. Zhu Hong, Pa chan fa de xin bihn bud, (1 ft) [The New Bankruptcy Law Changes], 9
ZiONGGUO JJN RONG [CHINA FIN.] 24, 24 (2007) (China).
19. See Zh6ng hui ren min g6ng h6 gu6 min shi si6 s6ng fa, ( A ~l i~i'Al) [Law on Civil
Procedure (China)] (promulgated by Order No. 44 of the President, Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991),
available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law view.asp?id=7535.
20. See Zh6ng bui ren min g6ng h6 gu6 qi yb p6 chan fa (shi xing) (
[Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (for Trial Implementation) (China)] (promulgated by Order No. 45 of the
President, Dec. 2, 1986, no longer effective), available at http://www.law-lib.com/law/law view.asp?id=200.
21. See Zhu Hong, supra note 18.
22. See Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (China), supra note 17.
23. Although in the New Bankruptcy Law the legislature uses the word "administrator," it is widely be-
lieved that the "administrator" mechanism is introduced from U.S. bankruptcy law, and its role is equivalent
to a "trustee." See Zhu Hong, supra note 18; see also Wu Jianmin, Xin q? ye po chanfa de chuhngxin di?nfn xi
(VE AM IfI) [The Analysis of the Innovations of the New Bankruptcy Law], 20 SHANG YE
Sm DAl [COM. TIMEs] 65, 66 (2007) (China); Yang Jian, P6 chan guan li rin zbi du ping xi
( li [Accessing the Bankruptcy Trustee Mechanism], 512 SHANG YE XIAN DAl HUA
[MARKET MODERNIZATIoNl 291, 291 (2007) (China).
24. See Yang Zhengyu, Gudn yd shen li qi ye po chan anjin qui ding guan li rin bho chou de guiding de li jiyu
shi ping (f A 1 5 i(#1) [The Understanding and Application
of the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Designation of Administrators During the Trial of
Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases], 11 REN MIN Si FA [PEOPLE JUSTICE] 21, 21 (2007) (China) (in this Chinese
Supreme Court Journal, most of the articles are written by judges. This article discusses the process of
making an explanatory judicial order by the Supreme Court on trustee's compensation. In fact, foreign legis-
lation is the main source of reference in the procedure).
25. See Jiang Xinye, Guan li rin zai pa chan chong zhing zh6ng de jul se ding wei ji qi gui zhi wdn shin
(- )[Regulatory Improvement and Role Orientation of Trustees
in Reorganizations], 287 FA Lv SHI YONG [J.L. APPLICATION] 77, 77 (2009) (China).
26. See Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (China), supra note 17. This English translation is from a commer-
cial legal database provider rather than an official. However, there is no official English version of the New
Bankruptcy Law.
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merated in Article 25,27 while Article 27 serves as the catchall provision that allows for
private suits. The vagueness of these statutes and other factors discussed herein diminish
the efficacy of the trustee mechanism. The dysfunction of the trustee mechanism in
China necessitates a retrospective analysis of the trustee mechanism under U.S. bank-
ruptcy law. This article will examine trustee liability in reorganizations under U.S. bank-
ruptcy law and related problems under China's New Bankruptcy Law. Further, this
article proposes solutions to the contemporary problems of the New Bankruptcy Law.
Part II of this article provides a summary and explanation of the judicial decisions re-
garding the bankruptcy trustees' fiduciary duties in the United States. Part III analyzes
the effect of imposing corporate fiduciary duties on a trustee and suggests further tailoring
for the unique situation of the trustee. Part IV discusses the difficulties, created by im-
proper legislation, that the Chinese reorganization trustee faces, including the lack of in-
centives for trustee participation, the lack of properly qualified trustees, and the
disincentives for creditors to support the bankruptcy mechanism. This section will show
how these problems create high practice risk and unpredictability of private enforcement.
To solve the excessive risk problem and uncertainty problem, Part V proposes to reintro-
duce U.S. law, and the propositions developed from Parts II and II1 of this article, which
are based on past literature of the United States, so that the New Bankruptcy Law can
have a more complete and reasonable paragon from which to transplant. Part VI discusses
the need to improve the trustee's fiduciary duty mechanism from a broader
macroeconomic perspective and suggests using the "Case Directive" to facilitate the
implementation.
H. The "Crazy Quilt"
A. WHAT IS THE "CRAZY QILT"?
The "Crazy Quilt" is the term used in the Report of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission to epitomize the state of the law related to a trustee's personal liability. 28
Although there are a few provisions on trustee duties, no laws, including the Bankruptcy
Code, provide a personal liability standard for bankruptcy trustees. 29 This lack of a stan-
27. Id. art. 25 (stipulating that a bankruptcy administrator shall perform the following functions and duties:
(1)Taking over the assets, seals as well as the account books and documents of the debtor;
(2)Investigating into the financial status of the debtor and formulating the financial statements;
(3)Deciding the internal management of the debtor;
(4)Deciding the daily expenditure and other necessary expenditures of the debtor;
(5)Deciding, before the first creditors' meeting is held, to continue or suspend the debtor's
business;
(6)Managing and disposing of the debtors' assets;
(7)Participating actions, arbitrations or any other legal procedures on behalf of the debtor;
(8)Proposing to hold creditors' meetings; and
(9)Performing any other functions and duties that the people's court believes it should perform.
In the case of any separate provision on the bankruptcy administrator's functions and duties in the present
Law, it shall prevail). This provision is very ambiguous. It is still very hard to tell whether these nine are
duties or rights.
28. See NArilONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION, BANKRUPTrCy: THE NEi TIVENTY YEARS
859-60 (Oct. 20, 1997).
29. Id. at 860-61.
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dard has led many to seek interpretation from the U.S. Supreme Court case Mosser v.
Darrow.30 But Mosser has not solved the problem because some circuit courts have held
trustees liable for mere negligence, extraordinary negligence, and/or fraud, while others
have found judicial immunity for trustees whose acts fall within the scope of their author-
ity.31 The misinterpretation of Mosser increases the unpredictability of a trustee's personal
liability in a reorganization case. 32 The circuit courts' various interpretations of Mosser on
the standard of liability for bankruptcy trustees have led to what the Commission refers to
as "a crazy quilt" of decisions.
B. THE MOSSER CASE AND ITS PROGENIES
Around 100 A.D., the famous Chinese general Ts'ao Ts'ao was defeated in a battle that
took place in enemy territory.33 After the battle, his troops were dispersed and a bounty
was placed on his head. To avoid being discovered, the General Ts'ao fled to an old
friend's home, taking his personal bodyguard with him.34
While resting at his friend's home, General Ts'ao overheard his friend and his friend's
father say, "You can use the rope to tie. The rope in the barn is stronger and it is impossi-
ble to escape, even for a bull. I will stay here to sharpen knives. It's the time to pay him
back."35 Believing his friend was planning to do him harm, General Ts'ao and his body-
guard jumped into action and killed the eighteen people that were in the home.36 Unfor-
tunately, after the killings the General discovered a half-tied hog in the backyard and an
unfinished banquet that was being prepared in his honor.37
The relationship between Mosser and subsequent circuit court cases follows the same
logic as the above anecdotal story. The uncompromising execution based upon misinfor-
mation has resulted in irreversible loss and a great mess. In Mosser, a former trustee, Paul
Darrow, was sued by his successor, Stacy Mosser, for permitting two former employees,
Jacob Kulp and Myrtle Johnson, to trade in securities of the debtor's subsidiaries. 3  Kulp
and Johnson were investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for
breach of loyalty for self-dealing in the companies' bonds.39 The SEC Special Master
recommended surcharging Darrow.40 The District Court surcharged the trustee, but on
appeal the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision, holding that a trustee could not be
30. See Primack, supra note 6, at 1301-05.
31. NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COUMISSION, Supra note 28, at 860-61; see also Swift v. Watts, 185
B.R. 963, 970 n.7 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (explaining that absolute judicial immunity should be awarded to trustees
in a bankruptcy case); Howard v. Leonard, 101 B.R. 421, 422-23 (D.NJ. 1989).
32. See Primack, supra note 6, at 1306-09 (talking about the cases on trustee liability heard by circuit courts
under the influence of misinterpretations of the Mosser case).
33. Ts'ao Ts'ao, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY (2004), http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/
TsaoTsao.aspx.
34. Morgan Evans, Cao Cao (Mengde), BIOGRAPHY OF CAO CAO, 2004, http://kongming.net/nove/sgyvy/
caocao.php.
35. Id.
36. Murder of Lu Bosche, CAO CAO, http://cao-cao.co.tv/#Murder_ofLL_Boshe (last visited May 15, 2011).
37. Id.
38. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 268-70.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 270.
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surcharged unless he was guilty of "supine negligence."4' The Supreme Court reversed
the Seventh Circuit's decision and found Darrow personally liable for the indiscrete ac-
tions of Kulp and Johnson.42 Justice Jackson delivered a narrow opinion for the Court.43
In Mosser, Darrow knowingly contracted with Kulp and Johnson, resulting in the underly-
ing breach. 4 Such action was beyond the trustee's authority and therefore Darrow's will-
ful and deliberate act breached the trustee's fiduciary duty.45 The Court provided very
important guidance in judging the standard of trustee's duty in reorganization, stating:
Trustees are often obliged to make difficult business judgments, and the best that
disinterested judgment can accomplish with foresight may be open to serious criti-
cism by obstreperous creditors aided by hindsight. Court[s] are quite likely to protect
trustees against heavy liabilities for disinterested mistakes in business judgment. But
a trusteeship is serious business and is not to be undertaken lightly or so discharged.
The most effective sanction for good administration is personal liability for the con-
sequences of forbidden acts, and there are ways by which a trustee may effectively
protect himself against personal liability.46
The Court discussed the trustee's willful and deliberate breach of his fiduciary duty.
This decision should be read narrowly, as the Mosser Court did not address a trustee's
personal liability with regard to negligent actions.47 In dicta, Mosser has provided gui-
dance and a starting point for later courts.48 But later courts have misconstrued the opin-
ion of Mosser.49 Like General Ts'ao, the lower courts have misunderstood the U.S.
Supreme Court's message in Mosser and have incorrectly applied a broad brush in their
formulations of a standard of fiduciary duty for the reorganization trustee.
Different interpretations of the Mosser ruling have led to different results in the later
courts, even within the same circuit. The Fifth Circuit in Boullin v. McClanahan50 ruled
that trustees are protected by derived judicial immunity.si But in In re Miller Smyth, III,
the Fifth Circuit held that "trustees should not be subjected to personal liability unless
they are found to have acted with gross negligence."52 The Tenth Circuit in Sberr v.
Winkler held trustees will only be held liable for willful and deliberate acts.5 3 More inter-
estingly, the court opined:
Mosser v. Darrow .. . established the rules that a trustee or receiver in bankruptcy is
(a) not liable, in any manner, for mistake in judgment where discretion is allowed, (b)
41. Id. at 272.
42. Id. at 270.
43. Primack, supra note 6, at 1302.
44. Mosser, 341 U.S. at 272.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 273-74.
47. Id. at 270; Dodson v. Huff (In re Smyth), 207 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cit. 2000).
48. Primack, supra note 6, at 1304.
49. Id. at 1306.
50. Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cit. 1981).
51. Id.
52. Dodson, 207 F.3d at 762.
53. Sherr v. Winkler, 552 F.3d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977).
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liable personally only for acts determined to be willful and deliberate in violation of
his duties and (c) liable, in his official capacity, for acts of negligence.54
The U.S. Supreme Court did not expressly provide any such rules.55 Some academics
have doubted whether the Supreme Court implied such beliefs in its dicta.5 6 The incon-
sistent lower court rulings regarding the standard of the trustee's fiduciary duty confuse
both legal professionals and trustees alike. Unfortunately, the revision of bankruptcy law
in 2005 still leaves this issue untouched.57 One vital goal of any commercial law regime is
certainty and finality of transactions.58 It is imperative to consolidate and harmonize past
court decisions with academic insights to construct a reasonable and widely acceptable
standard that is a valuable reference for courts, trustees, and the legislature.
C. Two DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES AND ONE CONFUSION
1. Why Bifurcated?
After Mosser, later court decisions can be classified into two schools, those applying the
"negligence standard" and those applying the "heightened standard."59 The courts that
follow the negligence standard believe that trustees should be found in breach of a fiduci-
ary duty when the trustee acts negligently.o The courts that follow the heightened stan-
dard are more lenient and will only find a breach if the trustee acts with gross negligence
or commits willful and deliberate acts.61 The circuit courts do not provide proper ratio-
nale as to why they opt for either standard.62 But it is not too difficult to speculate on the
reasons. As mentioned in the introduction of this article, protecting innocent and hard-
working trustees and providing adequate protection to the estate and creditors are the
issues at stake in these court decisions.
For policy reasons, the heightened standard gives trustees protection from "criticism by
obstreperous creditors aided by hindsight." 63 The crucial question here is whether the
heightened standard is a sine que non to protect innocent and hard-working trustees prop-
erly. Will trustees be in jeopardy or be unfairly treated if we apply the lower negligence
standard? Is there any other option that will bring less adjudicative confusion and incon-
sistency and fit better into the common law fiduciary duty system? This article will try to
answer these questions by examining the common law fiduciary duty from a theoretical
perspective in Part III.
54. Id.
55. See generally Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 268-70 (1951).
56. See, e.g., Primack, supra note 6, at 1306.
57. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9,
119 Stat. 23 (2005).
58. See, e.g., In re Kontrick, 295 F.3d 724, 732 (7th Cir. 2002) (specifically recognizing the "Bankruptcy
Code's goal of promoting certainty and finality for debtors").
59. Compare Dodson v. Huff (In re Smyth), 207 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cit. 2000) (heightened standard), and
Boullion v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cit. 1981) (heightened standard), with Sherr v. Winkler, 552
F.2d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977) (negligence standard).
60. See, e.g., Sherr, 552 F.3d at 1375.
61. See, e.g., Dodson, 207 F.3d at 762; Boullion, 639 F.3d at 214.
62. See, e.g., Dodson, 207 F.3d at 762; Boullion, 639 F.3d at 214; Sherr, 552 F.3d at 1375.
63. See Mosser, 341 U.S. at 273-74 (1951). This consideration can be found in the Mosser case, even though
it is not a "heightened standard" case.
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2. Absolute Judicial Immunity
Given the U.S. Supreme Court's ambiguous stance on willful and deliberate acts, later
courts have developed the "absolute judicial immunity" doctrine.64 Although there are
subtle differences among the applications of the absolute judicial immunity doctrine, 65 the
application condition of judicial immunity has been misunderstood. The absolute judicial
immunity doctrine only applies when trustees are acting within the scope of their duties or
executing a specific bankruptcy court order and are sued by a third party, rather than by
any bankruptcy parties in interest. 66
According to the doctrines of judicial and sovereign immunity, judges and government
defendants are immune from any lawsuits when they are challenged regarding actions
performed within the scope of their duties.6 7 In Gregory v. United States/U S. Bankruptcy
Court, the court found that a trustee merely executing the bankruptcy judge's orders is
protected from any lawsuit regarding the execution of those orders. 68 This immunity is
called quasi-judicial immunity. 69 There should not be any doubt cast on this immunity,
because trustees executing court orders are just like judicial clerks enforcing judges' or-
ders. Following this rationale, if trustees voluntarily or involuntarily incur third party
liability while acting within the scope of their duties (such as entering into or breaching a
contract), the estate should bear the legal consequences rather than the trustees. 70 This
follows the same logic as that of the management's agent immunity in daily business oper-
ation of a solvent firm; because management was hired by the corporation, the actions of
management are regarded as the actions of the corporation. Some literature recognizes
the legitimacy of this immunity, although it has many names. 7 1
Such immunity should not be broadened to include the conduct of the trustee that is
not expressly approved by the court. 72 This is because the inherent relationship of the
trustee and the stakeholders is one of trust, and the trust between the fiduciaries and the
64. Swift v. Watts, 185 B.R. 963, 970 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1995); Howard v. Leonard, 101 B.R. 421, 422-23
(D.NJ. 1989); Boullion, 639 F.2d at 214.
65. In the Howard opinion, the court held that:
It is axiomatic that judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for their judicial
acts . . . Absolute judicial immunity has been extended to those non-judges whose duties and
functions are 'an integral part of the judicial process.' Absolute immunity has been specifically
conferred on trustees in bankruptcy. Because a trustee's immunity is derived from that afforded
to the bankruptcy judge, a trustee will enjoy absolute immunity so long as he does not act in the
clear absence of all jurisdiction, or at least acts under the supervision of the bankruptcy judge.
Howard, 101 B.R. at 422-23. But in the Boullion case, the judge found a "trustee acting at the direction of a
bankruptcy judge is clothed with absolute immunity against tort acnons grounded on his conduct as trustee."
Boullion, 639 F.2d at 214.
66. See Bogart, supra note 15, at 717-20.
67. Gregory v. United States/U.S. Bankr. Court, 942 F.2d 1498, 1500 (10th Cir. 1991).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1500 n.1.
70. In re Chi. Pac. Corp., 773 F.2d 909, 916 (7th Cir. 1985) (Wood, J., holding that trustee owed no
fiduciary duty to the third party (vendors) and thus could not be sued in his personal capacity).
71. See Bogart, supra note 15, at 717 (discussing the derived judicial immunity that kicks in when trustees
act within the scope of their duties and are sued by a third party).
72. Id. at 720.
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beneficiaries deserves the protection of the fiduciary rules. 73 According to Frank Easter-
brook and Daniel Fischel, "a 'fiduciary' relation is a contractual one characterized by un-
usually high costs of specification and monitoring."74 This is especially true in the
reorganization trusteeship context as a bankruptcy trustee may be selected by the parties
in interest, creditors, and shareholders, or by the courts. 75 The trustee is paid based on
their management of the insolvent business. 76 If trustees can claim immunity from a
breach of duty of care or duty of loyalty, the fiduciary relation between trustees and par-
ties in interest will be rendered meaningless.
Admittedly, trustees do have immunities.77 But those immunities are available only
when trustees act in a judicial agent capacity, or an organizational agent capacity towards a
third party.78 Similarly, the board of directors of a company enjoys the protections of the
business judgment rule, but not absolute immunity.79 Arbitrarily inserting absolute im-
munity into the fiduciary relationship, which is a contributory cause to the series of
"Crazy Quilt" decisions, will invite inconsistency of adjudications. There is a significant
amount of literature, including the Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commis-
sion, which suggests that corporate fiduciary duties should be transplanted into the bank-
ruptcy trustee context.80 Does the corporate fiduciary duty fit into the bankruptcy trustee
context? And if so, do the duties need to be tailored?
II. Corporate Fiduciary Duty, an Elixir?
A. A CONTROVERSIAL SOLUTION: CORPORATE LAW'S STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reorganizations, trustees have a multitude of tasks, such as assuming or rejecting
contracts, conducting a sale, avoiding preferential or fraudulent transactions, accounting
for property, and examining and objecting to claims.81 Given that the business is insol-
vent, a trustee's work can have greater risk than that of management of a solvent firm.
The trustee must operate the firm's daily management while dealing with the many
problems that arise under the firm's deteriorating financial situation. 82 It is not a saga-
cious choice to leave such an important job unregulated or subject to the highly repugnant
73. See E. Allen Tiller, Personal Liability of Trustees and Receivers in Banknuptcy, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 75, 76
(1979).
74. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J. L. & ECON. 425, 427
(1993).
75. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1104 (2006).
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 326 (2006).
77. See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 15, at 717.
78. Id. at 717-20.
79. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (Westlaw).
80. See, e.g., Primack, supra note 6, at 1299; see also Alexander Wu, Motivating Disclosure by a Debtor in
Bankruptcy: The Bankruptcy Code, Intellectual Property, and Fiduciary Duties, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 481, 481
(2009).
81. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1106 (2006) (setting forth duties of a trustee).
82. Id.
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present judicial review standards.83 To clear up the mess of the "Crazy Quilt" of decisions,
the Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission suggested:
A Chapter 11 trustee of a corporate debtor only should be subject to suit in the
trustee's representative capacity and subject to suit in the trustee's personal capacity
only to the extent that the trustee has violated the standard of care applicable to
officers and directors of a corporation in the state in which the Chapter 11 case is
pending.84
The Committee believes that incorporating corporate fiduciary duty into the trustee
fiduciary duty system would clear up the current mess. 85 Other literature also supports
the proposition that incorporation of the corporate director's standard of review into the
bankruptcy trustee context is the best solution to solve "Crazy Quilt" problem. 86 Corpo-
rate fiduciary duties have had a long period of review by the courts and are therefore
systematical and comprehensive duties. Considering the highly similar functions and re-
sponsibilities between corporate directors and trustees in reorganization, it is the optimal
solution to the confusion regarding trustees' fiduciary duties. But there is still a lot of
academic debate on whether the solution is viable.8 7
The proponents of the incorporation of a corporate law standard of review believe that
it will provide trustees enough latitude in reorganization while also protecting the estate
and creditor by requiring trustees to make informed, reasonable decisions. 8 Opponents
attack the incorporation of corporate fiduciary law in two ways by arguing that: (1) the
incorporation would create fifty different fiduciary standards for Chapter 11 trustees and
(2) the contractual explanation of corporate fiduciary duty does not make sense in the
reorganization trustees' scenario.89 But these attacks are vulnerable and rebuttable.
First, the creation of fifty different fiduciary standards for Chapter 11 trustees does not
really matter. Fiduciary duties are contextual 90 and therefore are "one of the most elusive
concepts in Anglo-American law." 91 Thus there is no unified corporate fiduciary duty.92
The facts speak for themselves. After about 180 years of practice, generations of legal
professionals have not found a unified corporate fiduciary duty that can replace a context-
specific approach. 93 Currently, no one can assert what specific adverse effects will be in-
83. For examples of these unsettled judicial review standards, see Dodson v. Huff (In re Smyth), 207 F.3d
758, 762 (5th Cir. 2000); Boullin v. McClanahan, 639 F.2d 213, 214 (5th Cit. 1981); Sherr v. Winkler, 552
F.3d 1367, 1375 (10th Cir. 1977).
84. NATIONAL BANKRuVrcY REVIEW CoMMISSION, supra note 28, at 842. This provision was not
adopted during the 2005 bankruptcy law revision. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
85. NATIONAL BANKRUPCY REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 28, at 842.
86. See, e.g., Primack, stpra note 6, at 1319-20; Wu, supra note 80, at 499-502.
87. See, e.g., Bogart, supra note 15, at 736-44.
88. See, e.g., Primack, supra note 6, at 1320.
89. See, e.g., Bogart, stpra note 15, at 737.
90. See, e.g., Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VANO. L. REv. 1399, 1400
(2002); A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L. J. 879, 879 (1988).
91. DeMott, supra note 90, at 879.
92. Although there are some widely recognized directive corporate fiduciary duty model acts, such as the
Model Business Corporation Act, they are not valid and enforceable law. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.31
(2008) (introducing a general standard of corporate fiduciary duty).
93. See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 93, 96-97 (1979).
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vited by applying state corporate law fiduciary duty. Additionally, in a bankruptcy case it
is barely news that judges look into specific applicable state law to decide specific matters,
such as whether contracts are assumable or assignable. State laws work perfectly in the
bankruptcy context as long as they have been tailored properly. There are no adverse
dynamics between codified bankruptcy law and state corporate fiduciary laws.
Second, viewing the relationship of fiduciaries as one of contract is not a complete
approach. Although law on the fiduciary duty is "messy," many U.S. scholars have suc-
cessfully crafted a unified theory of fiduciary duty.94 The contractual explanation of cor-
porate fiduciary duty is but one of these approaches and is not perfect-even if it is the
most widely endorsed theory in academia. 95 Professor Roberta Romano commented on
this theory as a "valuable contribution to our understanding of fiduciary duty law" and one
that still needed to be fully elaborated.96 There is an array of compelling theories that can
be used to explain the fiduciary relationship, such as "critical resource" theory and "trust-
vulnerability" theory. 97 Why should the contractual explanation be the only justification
for the existence of fiduciary duty? Additionally, courts typically do not attempt to explain
why fiduciary duties are imposed in formal fiduciary relationships. From the judiciary's
perspective, many of these relationships have been considered fiduciary in nature for cen-
turies, and any attempt to explain that status seems unnecessary. Therefore, whether con-
tractual explanation makes sense in a reorganization trustee scenario should not be
controlling in the pursuit of bankruptcy law certainty.
In sum, the Report of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's suggested ap-
proach to the incorporation of corporate fiduciary duty into the bankruptcy trustee con-
text is a viable solution to standardizing judicial review. Further, current opponents'
arguments are not theoretically compelling. But the questions that must be answered are
whether the differences between corporate directors' functions in a solvent firm and trust-
ees' functions in an insolvent firm matter in incorporating corporate fiduciary duty to
reorganization trustees' duty and whether the different dynamics between management
and its beneficiaries in both solvent and insolvent firms can be ignored.
B. DIFFERENT WORKS, SAME DTy? THE DIFFICULTY OF APPLYING THE SAME
STANDARD
As mentioned previously, fiduciary duties should be measured contextually.98 Thus, it
is inappropriate to apply a strict standard to a possible breach of duty without attention to
the facts. When looking to incorporate corporate duties, the bankruptcy trustee's situa-
tion must be considered. Changes should be made to the application of the corporate
duties to allow for an efficient relationship between the trustees and stakeholders.
94. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 90, at 1400.
95. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 74.
96. See Roberta Romano, Comment On Easterbrook and Fischel, "Contract and Fiduciary Duty", 36 J.L. &
EcON. 447, 450 (1993).
97. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 90, at 1431; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 810 (1983);
Austin W. Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CAL. L. REV. 539 (1949); L.S. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships, 1962
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 69; J.C. Shepherd, Towards a Unified Concept ofFiduciary Relationships, 97 L.Q. REV. 51, 51
(1981).
98. See Smith, supra note 90, at 1400.
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Operational strategies of a trustee and director are dissimilar. Although most daily
work performed by reorganization trustees and directors in a solvent firm are not signifi-
cantly and essentially different, the nuances between different working situations and deci-
sion procedures still matter in deciding whether they deserve the same standard of review.
First, directors manage a company in-good or bad financial situations, while trustees by
the nature of the situation are managing failing businesses. In such a situation, there are
fewer opportunities and it is more difficult to find creditors that will loan money to the
floundering firm. Deficits are found on the books. Further, if former management af-
fected fraudulent transactions that contributed to the current failing state of affairs, such
transactions are likely to be well hidden from discovery. Is it fair to impose the same
standard of review against these struggling reorganization trustees? Second, making a
business decision in a solvent firm is easier than in a bankruptcy. For example, it is much
easier for a succeeding or performing enterprise to raise capital. After the famous case of
Smith v. Van Gorkom,99 the business judgment rule has been shaped into one that shields
directors from more exacting levels of review once some conditions, such as proper out-
sourcing or ample meeting time, are met. 0 0 Unfortunately, these specified conditions
usually include hiring expensive outside consultants, such as investment banks, to justify
important management decisions.oI This expensive action may be too luxurious for
trustees in reorganization because there are limited funds available. Trustees must find
cost-saving ways to resurrect the deteriorating business rather than diminishing creditors'
bankruptcy dollars with meaningless outsourcing to protect themselves from exacting ju-
dicial review.10 2 If courts impose the prerequisites of the business judgment rule on re-
viewing trustees' acts in reorganization, it will exacerbate the intensive tension between
trustees and beneficiaries. Trustees might lower their practice risks by squandering bene-
ficiaries' resources. If the estate ends up in liquidation, then the beneficiaries are worse
off. Third, in reorganization, trustees are facing indignant creditors, who are ready to sue
when they perceive any sloppy business decisions being made by the trustee. Collective
action problems'0 3 in reorganization cases occur far less often than in solvent firms, be-
cause creditors, unlike shareholders, cannot "vote with their feet.""" Therefore, creditors
99. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
100. See Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, Assessing the Applicability of the Business Judgment Rule and the "Defensive"
Business Judgment Rule in the Chinese Judiciary: A Perspective on Takeover Case Adjudications, 34 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 124, 129 (2010) (explaining the business judgment rule and its application conditions).
101. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 858; Joseph W. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE LJ. 1078, 1099 (1968).
102. See Kenneth E. Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35
STAN. L. REV. 927, 927 (1983) (criticizing outsourcing and time wasting procedure as redundant, even for
corporate directors).
103. "Diffuse stock ownership presents shareholders with formidable collective action problems in attempt-
ing to exercise their control right." Some shareholders considering cost-benefit effects will not exercise their
ownership right, resulting in management having more latitude in making business decisions. REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCIONAL APPROACH
62 (2d ed. 2009).
104. Shareholders can express their dissatisfaction with managements' decisions by selling the stocks they
holding. See, e.g., Eric M. Forgel, David I. Addis & Edward C. Harris, Public Shareholders Acting Like Owners:
Three Reforms-Introducing the "Oversight Shareholder," 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517 (2004); see also ROBERT
PARiNNO, ET AL., VOTING WITH THEIR FEET-INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CEO TURNOVER Jan. 3,
2002), available at http://www.mecombs.utexas.edulaimcenter/Working%20Papers/Parrino2.pdf
SUMMER 2011
660 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
must act quickly and actively; otherwise, they probably will end up with nothing. If trust-
ees cannot be awarded more protection, they will face more negligent lawsuits than corpo-
rate directors do.
Corporate fiduciary duties are the best example for reorganization fiduciary duties to
learn from because of their sophistication and applicability to reorganization fiduciary du-
ties. But given the differences of their tasks and fiduciary-beneficiary dynamics, corporate
fiduciary duties need to be better tailored to the needs of reorganization. Corporate fidu-
ciary duties should provide an optimal foundation for the reorganization fiduciary duty to
build upon. Some revisions are necessary. Through taking one more step, a more suitable
standard of review can be established.
C. THE PATH OF How To TAILOR
How to tailor the corporate fiduciary duty is the last problem that must be tackled to
incorporate it properly into the reorganization trustees' fiduciary duty mechanism. The
key to this last problem is how to keep the appropriate tension between protecting inno-
cent, hard-working trustees while providing adequate protection for the estate and credi-
tors. As mentioned earlier, there is no significant difference between the daily operations
of a trustee in reorganization and a corporate director. 05 Therefore, we can incorporate
corporate fiduciary duties as a foundation for trustee fiduciary duties. By doing so, this
solves the estate and creditors' protection problem by providing private parties, such as
creditors and investors, with a tool for private enforcement.10 6 To restrict the discretion
of adjudicators in determining whether a violation has occurred, thus protecting the hon-
est trustees, 0 7 the business judgment rule can be used. 08 But is the business judgment
rule suitable for trustee fiduciary duty?
If management's actions meet the standard of conduct set by common law, the business
judgment rule would apply. The standard of conduct applicable to directors and officers
of U.S. corporations is set forth in Section 4.01(a) of the American Law Institute's Princi-
ples of Corporate Governance.109 It is a fairly demanding standard, but the standard of
review applied to the performance of these duties is less stringent.1 0 When directors' and
officers' decisions are called into question, as long as all four of the conditions of the
business judgment rule are met judges will not question management's decisions." The
four conditions are: (1) directors must have made a decision; generally, the rule is inappli-
105. See Primack, supra note 6, at 1299.
106. See KRAAKmAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 39.
107. Id. at 40.
108. See Weng, supra note 100, at 127-30.
109. Section 4.01(a) of American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance reads:
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director's or officer's functions
in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation, and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to
exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDA-
TIONS § 4.01(a) (1994).
110. See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESs ORGANIZATIONS 545 (8th ed.
2000).
111. Id. at 540.
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cable to an omission; (2) directors may not have an interest, personally or financially, in
the subject-matter; if the interest will reasonably be expected to affect their judgment, the
standard of review will be heightened and the business judgment rule will be inapplicable;
(3) directors must have employed a reasonable decision making process; this is the justifi-
cation that enables directors to reasonably make appropriate decisions; and (4) decisions
should be made in good faith; if the decision breaches the law, the business judgment rule
is inapplicable.]12 The standard of conduct seems highly consistent with the trustee sce-
nario. But, as mentioned before, the third condition, "reasonable decision making pro-
cess," will invite some trouble.
The business judgment rule is applicable in some important situations, such as during a
takeover; and, when certain procedural requirements are met,113 management can en-
trench themselves from more exacting judicial review.' 4 But this strategy does not seem
to be the best for trustees of an insolvent firm. It is improper to excuse all trustee deci-
sions under the business judgment rule, as many agency problem-preventing mechanisms,
such as the exit mechanism, are not an option in reorganization."15 Nevertheless, trustees
should be more prudent on crucial issues to protect the estate and creditors from sloppy
decisions. Some courts have held that trustees are liable for mere negligence through this
reasoning."i 6 If there are no special requirements for trustees in making important deci-
sions, the balance of protection between the estate and creditors, on the one hand, and
trustees, on the other hand, will be broken. The disproportionate protection will dis-
incentivize trustees to act appropriately and leave beneficiaries unable to protect them-
selves through litigation.
Further, the business judgment rule must not have judicial approval as a prerequisite
since the purpose of the business judgment rule is to prevent judges, who typically have no
business experience, from meddling in fiduciaries' business decisions.117 Even the most
learned judges cannot assert that they know the market and business better than trustees.
It is much wiser to have courts scrutinize how trustees came to make a decision rather
than to scrutinize the business decision itself.
Only in very rare cases will a bankruptcy judge decide to specifically pre-approve a
trustee's acts. For instance, a court would not like to authorize the specific steps the
trustee took in conducting a sale. Therefore, it is practically unviable and theoretically
unreasonable to require court approval for the business judgment protection. A better
approach that is both low-cost and effective would be to require disclosure.
Disclosure plays a fundamental role in controlling agency problems.'18 Although man-
dated disclosure is criticized as ineffective in many situations,1 9 it would work perfectly by
112. Id. at 545.
113. Id. at 540.
114. See Weng, supra note 100, at 128-29.
115. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 39-45.
116. See, e.g., Park v. Perry, 703 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir. 1983).
117. See Melvin Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law,
62 FORDHAM L. REv. 437, 444 (1993).
118. See Weng, supra note 100, at 49. In the Mosser case, Justice Jackson also underscored the importance of
disclosure in trustee fiduciary duty. See Mosser, 341 U.S. at 274 (1951).
119. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & Carle E. Schneider, The Failure ofMandated Disclosure 5 (John M. Olin
Law & Economics Working Paper No. 516, 2010), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edulfiles/file/516-
obs-disclosure.pdf (discussing the systematic failure of mandated disclosure. The authors believe that, first,
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ad hoc disclosure in reorganization. Mandated disclosure is less efficient when: (1) disc-
losees do not receive information; (2) disclosees do not read disclosed information, do not
understand it when they read it, or do not use it even if they understand it, (e.g. consumers
don't read and understand the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) disclosures); and (3) disc-
losees' decisions are not improved by the mandatory disclosures.120 But these concerns
are unwarranted in reorganization. First, interested parties in bankruptcy are more active
than other disclosees in acquiring information related to their interests, because the cost
of being inert will result in fewer bankruptcy dollars if the reorganization fails. And the
chances are high that the reorganization will fail.121 Second, interest groups not only will
read any ad hoc disclosure, but will also evaluate the quality of the trustee's decision. In
most commercial firm reorganizations a large portion of creditors are businessmen or
bankers. They are very sensitive to any bad decision. Sometimes, they are even more
sophisticated in the business than the trustees themselves. Third, although disclosure will
not improve beneficiaries' decisions because beneficiaries are bonded with the distressed
operating business, it will assist in raising a red flag if there are any fraudulent activities.
This will allow interested parties to petition the bankruptcy court ex ante to prevent bad
business decisions or ex post for discovery in a lawsuit for breach of fiduciary duty. Most
importantly, ad hoc disclosure can be viewed as part of a reasonable decision making pro-
cess and can avail the protection provided by the business judgment rule. Thus, through
the protection of the business judgment rule and disclosure, trustees will be capable of
making decisions that have the appropriate amount of risk.122
Having tackled the core question-the standard of review-we turn our attention to the
duties of loyalty and immunity. Fortunately these are not very complex issues. Mosser
states that no court will excuse any intentional breach of duty.123 On this point, there is
no difference between the literature and the courts' application of the rule.124 Any willful
and deliberate infringement on the beneficiaries should be regarded as a breach of fiduci-
ary duty. Given that the breach of duty of loyalty is always a deliberate, intentional, and
self-interested act, the business judgment rule is inapplicable.125 Immunity only exists
when either the: (1) trustee causes damage to a third party while acting within the scope
of its duty;' 26 or when (2) the trustee's acts are specifically approved by the courts.127 No
immunity is applicable when trustees negligently or purposely cause beneficiaries dam-
age,128 even if under the courts' general approval.
mandated disclosure rests on false assumptions about how people live, think, and make decisions. Second, it
rests on false assumptions about the decisions it intends to improve. Third, its success requires an impossibly
long series of unlikely achievements by lawmakers, disclosers, and disclosees. That is, the prerequisites of
successful mandated disclosure are so numerous and so onerous that they are rarely met).
120. Id. at 15.
121. See WARREN & BUSSEL, supra note 4, at 573-693.
122. See DAVID A. SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAws IN CORPORATE
AMERICA 205 (2005).
123. See Mosser, 341 U.S. at 267 (1951).
124. Id.
125. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ("The 'business judgment rule,' however,
yields to the rule of undivided loyalty. This great rule of law is designed 'to avoid the possibility of fraud and
to avoid the temptation of self-interest.' ").
126. See Bogart, supra note 15, at 717-20.
127. See Tiller, supra note 73, at 75.
128. See Bogart, supra note 15, at 720.
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IV. Trustee in Reorganization of the New Chinese Bankruptcy Law: An
Improved Vehicle, But Only Half Way
A. LEGISLATIVE HiSTORY
Chinese bankruptcy legislation has evolved through three stages. In the first stage,
before 1984, known as the Planned Economy period, no bankruptcy law was promul-
gated.129 During the Planned Economy 30 period, all transactions were organized by the
government per the plan made at the beginning of each period. Enterprises focused on
assigned tasks rather than profitability. As a result, business organizations could not go
into bankruptcy voluntarily or be forced into involuntary bankruptcy.
The second stage occurred from 1984 to 2007. After the "Open Door" policy became
effective in 1978, most of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were suffering serious
debt problems. In an attempt to transform the Planned Economy into a "Market Econ-
omy," the legislature promulgated the first Chinese bankruptcy regulation. In 1984, the
Trial Implementation created a legalized SOEs market exit mechanism instead of an ad-
ministrative market exit mechanism.
Over the next several years, the ratio of private economy to national economy skyrock-
eted.131 And since the Trial Implementation did not apply to private firms,132 the 1991
legislature incorporated Chapter XIX into civil procedure law, which allowed for bank-
ruptcy of private companies. 33 Both the Trial Implementation and Chapter XIX came
out with a strong administrative influence. Although the Trial Implementation has a reor-
ganization mechanism that subordinates commercial credit claims to employee payment
claims and government property rights,13' the reorganization management "Liquidation
Group" (Qing Suan Zu) consists of government officials who know more about how to
reallocate and comfort employees than how to run business.133 Because of this lack of
professionalism and financial focus, twenty-one years of the Trial Implementation 3 6 led
to no successful reorganizations. 137 All reorganizations unanimously failed.
After a nearly thirty-year incubation period, the New Bankruptcy Law was enacted in
2006 and implemented in 2007.138 This is the third stage. The New Bankruptcy Law is
widely considered as the first modernized and market economy oriented bankruptcy law.
129. See Gongalves, syupra note 16, at 20-21.
130. Id. at 1.
131. From 1978 to 2006, SOE's share in national economy fell from 82% to 9.1%. See, e.g., Yin Xiuchao,
Zhing gud po chanfa lifajin ching de hutigtyu zhan roing (' L llfi$R) [Retrospect and
Forward Looking to Chinese Bankruptcy Legislation Progress], available at http://www.chinalaw.org.cn/Col-
umn/ColumnView.aspxColuimnID=396&InfoID=1614.
132. Law on Enterprise Bankruptcy (for Trial Implementation) (China), supra note 20.
133. Law on Civil Procedure (China), supra note 19.
134. Gonqalves, supra note 16, at 2.
135. See Yang Jian, Po chan guan li rin zbi du ping x^ (eF AWlRWMT) [Accessing the Bankruptcy Trus-
tee Mechanism], 512 SHANG YE X1AN Du HUA [MARKET MODFRNIZATION] 291, 291 (2007).
136. The Trial Implementation was officially effective from 1986 to 2007. See Law on Enterprise Bank-
ruptcy (for Trial Implementation) (China), supra note 20.
137. Gongalves, supra note 16, at 2.
138. Zh6ng hu6 rdn min g6ng hb guo qi y6 po chan fa, ( 2NQ ' &) [Law on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (China)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006, effective
June 1, 2007), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-08/28/content-371296.htm.
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It is the first time that commercial credit claims have been ranked ahead of employee
payment claims and states' property rights.139 The New Bankruptcy Law transplanted the
bankruptcy trustee and reorganization mechanisms from U. S. Bankruptcy Code.140 But
they are not well tailored to fit the Chinese judiciary.
B. DnLEMMAs OF TRUSTEE MECHANISM AND WHERE THEY COME FROM
1. The Dilemmas
Because of the institutional defects of the bankruptcy trustee mechanism, few profes-
sionals wish to be trustees. This lack of interest has led to a shortage of trustees for the
bankruptcy courts. Most trustees are professionals from law firms and accounting
firms.141 In Fujian province, where there were 367 law firms and 4,163 lawyers in 2007,
only twenty-five law firms and fifty-nine individual lawyers applied for trustee candi-
dacy.142 Of these, only fifteen law firms and nine individual lawyers were selected to serve
as trustee.143 The average number of bankruptcy cases for a province of Fujian's size is
above 200 per year.144
Further exacerbating the problem, trustees' skills are far from satisfactory. Given that
the practice risk is extremely high 4 5 and that payment for a trustee is uncertain,' 46 profes-
sionals that do enter into the field intend to stay.147 As a result, trustees prefer to solicit
opinions from the courts to make up for their meager professional skills and to protect
against creditors' complaints.148 This turns bankruptcy courts into de facto trustees.' 4 9
Many bankruptcy judges complain that their workloads are far heavier since the proclama-
tion of the New Bankruptcy Law.' 50
From the perspective of the financially interested parties, the new reorganization trus-
tee mechanism is not much better than the Liquidation Group. Under the New Bank-
ruptcy Law, creditors have no say as to the selection of a trustee.15 Nor do bankruptcy
courts. According to the China Supreme Court, bankruptcy courts have no latitude in
139. See, e.g., Zhu Hong, supra note 18.
140. See id.
141. See Yang Zhengyu, Guinyd sbin li qiys po chan hnjiain qui ding guan li rin bao chdu de gui ding de ljil yu
shiydng (['iii A IThe Understanding and Application
of "the Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Payment of Administrators during the Trial of
Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases"], 6 REN MIN Si FA [PEOPLE JuSTICE] 21, 23 (2007).
142. See You Bingning, Zbi ye ffng xi?n kbng zhi wo gud pb chan guan li ren zhi dit de wdn shan
(L/ RxPV_10 : fil-G% ) [Practice Risk Control: the Suggestions of Chinese Bank-
ruptcy Trustee Mechanism],l 1 REN MIN Si FA [PEOPLE JUSTICE] 33, 35 (2009).
143. See id.
144. The number of bankruptcy cases for the Fujian province in 2007 is not available. But if we look at the
number of cases in a similarly sized province, Fujian Province's number would not be below 200. See Yang
Zhengyu, supra note 141, at 24.
145. See id. at 22.
146. See You Bingning, supra note 142, at 36.
147. See Jiang Xinye, supra note 25, at 78.
148. See You Bingning, supra note 142, at 36.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 33.
151. See Jiang Xinye, supra note 25, at 79.
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selecting trustees; all trustees are picked randomly out of a candidate pool. 152 The worst
part is that due to the incompleteness of the trustee fiduciary duty mechanism, it is very
tough for creditors to sue successfully trustees for sloppy and unprofessional management.
If the court grabs a bad apple creditors have no choice but to take it. The reorganization
trustee mechanism is in jeopardy.
2. The Causations of Dilemmas
The three reorganization problems of lack of participation, a lack of professional skills,
and creditors' disfavor of the mechanism greatly dampen the efficacy of the reorganization
trustee mechanism. These problems are deeply rooted in China's legal tradition. High
practice risk and the unpredictability of private enforcement create these dilemmas. If
these two issues can be resolved, the reorganization trustee mechanism will be a real ad-
vanced mechanism in increasing the value of an insolvent firm.
High practice risk is created by the uncertainty in bankruptcy administration. With
potential liabilities being greater than potential rewards, professionals have little interest
in working as a trustee. Further, for these professionals to improve their skills, they must
invest time and money. But if professionals cannot rely on a return on their investment,
they will not make that investment. Also, when making a decision for the insolvent firm
the trustee is more likely to make the easiest and safest decision, which is not always in the
best interest of the insolvent firm. Given that different professionals have different margi-
nal product of capital, which means that the better the professional is, the higher the
payback will be, a job with uncertain compensation and potential high litigation risk can-
not acquire the best professional for the job. If the payback is low and uncertain, only the
less trained and less compensated professionals will apply for this job. That is what is
happening in China. 5 3
In practice, cash is always a significant problem for an insolvent firm. It is not uncom-
mon for trustees to cover some of the firm's payments for a brief period.154 But the New
Bankruptcy Law has no provisions that regulate this kind of payment.'ss Given that a firm
in reorganization is clouded by previous bad business operation, bankruptcy judges tend to
limit the trustee's compensation at the beginning of a reorganization case. 5 6 According
to Article 5 of the "Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the Decision of Adminis-
trators' Compensation during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases" (Provisions of
Administrator Compensation), the amount of compensation cannot be changed unless a
creditor's meeting rejects it.157 The meager compensation is problematic when trustees
152. See Zui gio r6n mn fa yun guin yui shan li qi ye p6 chan In jibn rhi ding guan 1? r6n de gui ding
(FRAR NZ) [Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on the
Designation of Administrators During the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases (China)] art. 20 (adopted by
the Supreme People's Court, Apr. 4, 2007, effective June 1, 2007), available at http://www.chinacourt.org/
flwk/show.php?fileid=l17759.
153. See Jiang Xinye, supra note 25, at 78; see also You Bingning, supra note 142, at 35.
154. See You Bingning, supra note 142, at 34.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Zul gio r6n min fa yuin guin y-i sh6n li qi y6 p6 chan in jiin qul ding guan li rIn bo ch6u de gui
ding ( A AR ll M ) [Provisions of the Supreme People's
Court on the Decision of Administrators' Compensation during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases]
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pay for the firm's expenses out of their own pockets. Sometimes, when reorganization
fails, the firm cannot afford to compensate the trustee. 5 8 Even if trustees employ Article
12 of Provisions of Administrator Compensation and terminate the reorganization proce-
dure, trustees may still be left empty-handed. 5 9
But the major deterrent to participation is the unpredictable legal liability. Although
the New Bankruptcy Law has enumerated "duties" for trustees, 60 the sloppily drafted
catchall provision deters many professionals from practicing. Section 9 of Article 25 states
that bankruptcy trustees shall perform "any other functions and duties that the people's
court believes it should perform."' 6' The many different interpretations of this provision
invite chaos. Some judges have gone so far as to conclude that this puts a duty on the
trustee to find placement for the firm's former employees.162 To add to the confusion, the
New Bankruptcy Law, which adopts fiduciary duty from U.S. corporate law, provides that
a bankruptcy trustee shall be diligent and dutiful, and shall faithfully perform its duties as
well.163 This vague provision causes problems for the judiciary. If a bankruptcy court
reads Article 27 too broadly, then any bad decision will open the trustee to liability. Coin-
cidently, China's new corporate law of 2005 also introduced context-specific fiduciary du-
ties in one simple and sloppily drafted provision that has already drawn a lot of attention
from academia.164 Unlike corporate management, bankruptcy professionals are not able
to walk away easily from the chaos unless not applying for trustee candidacy.
(China)] art. 5 (adopted by the Supreme People's Court, Apr. 4, 2007, effective June 1, 2007), available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/showl.phpfile-id= 117758.
158. See You Bingning, supra note 142, at 34.
159. See Zul gio r6n min fa yuln guin y6 shIn li qi yb p6 chan in jiln que ding guan li r6n blo ch6u de gui
ding (ff4Xl ld A [Provisions of the Supreme People's
Court on the Decision of Administrators' Compensation during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases]
(China)] art. 12 (adopted by the Supreme People's Court, Apr. 4, 2007, effective June 1, 2007), available at
http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/showl.phpfile-id= 117758.
160. In the New Bankruptcy Law, art. 25 reads:
A bankruptcy administrator shall perform the following functions and duties:
(1) Taking over the assets, seals as well as the account books and documents of the debtor;
(2) Investigating into the financial status of the debtor and formulating the financial statements;
(3) Deciding the internal management of the debtor;
(4) Deciding the daily expenditure and other necessary expenditures of the debtor;
(5) Deciding, before the first creditors' meeting is held, to continue or suspend the debtor's
business;
(6) Managing and disposing of the debtors' assets;
(7) Participating actions, arbitrations or any other legal procedures on behalf of the debtor;
(8) Proposing to hold creditors' meetings; and
(9) Performing any other functions and duties that the people's court believes it should perform.
In the case of any separate provision on the bankruptcy administrator's functions and duties in the present
Law, it shall prevail. See id. art. 25.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., You Bingning, supra note 142, at 35; see also YangJian, spra note 135, at 291.
163. See Zh6ng hui r6n min g6ng hI guo qi y6 po chan fa, (- I [Law on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (China)] art. 27 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006,
effective June 1, 2007), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-08/28/content_371296.htm.
164. See Weng, supra note 100, 138-40.
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Similarly, creditors are dissatisfied with the vagueness of trustee liability. The unclear
trustee fiduciary duty provisions limit private enforcement.165 When creditors look to the
New Bankruptcy Law for a legal remedy, they find the enumerated "duties" in Article 25
ambiguous and unhelpful in differentiating between duty and function. 16 6 For instance,
Section 4 of Article 25 states that a trustee shall decide "the daily expenditure and other
necessary expenditures of the debtor."^6 7 This section defines the trustee's function rather
than the trustee's duty. If this is a functional definition rather than a standard of conduct,
plaintiffs cannot employ it to sue the trustee. The only provision that can be identified as
a duty is in Article 27. Contrary to the trustees' concerns, the interest groups are con-
cerned with what happens if the bankruptcy court narrowly applies the provision. Consid-
ering how difficult it is to litigate successfully, interested parties will not feel safe handing
the firm over to a trustee who will not be held culpable for negligent or self-benefitting
acts.
In sum, high practice risk and unpredictable private enforcement issues are the root
causes of the reorganization trustees' dilemmas. Tackling these two issues is the linchpin
in solving these dilemmas. It is obvious that the two issues share the same problem of
incompleteness that stems from the current trustee fiduciary duty legislation. Therefore,
the best solution is to revise the trustee liability provisions in the New Bankruptcy Law.
The trustee fiduciary duty mechanism and its externalities can properly tackle the above
problems and help encourage trustees to apply for candidacy.
V. The Solution: Second Time Transplantation
The reorganization trustee mechanism has been developing for over seventy years since
the promulgation of the Chandler Act of 1938.168 The past lessons and successes of this
reorganization trustee vehicle have helped to shape an effective and neutral management
method for insolvent firms. Although the trustee fiduciary duty mechanism is not perfect
in the United States, as discussed in the first and second sections of this Article, it is much
more complete than China's New Bankruptcy Law Article 27.
If the mechanism that is transplanted from foreign law is called into question, there are
two factors we should review: the difference of application environment and the complete-
ness of transplantation. Trustee fiduciary duty in reorganization is highly context-specific
and technical. It is specially devised for unique reorganization cases. Reorganization is a
carefully and deliberately designed institution used to resolve business failures rather than
indigenous cultural failures. Therefore, when discussing the applicability of a foreign
country's reorganization institution, it is necessary to reduce the impact of domestic cul-
ture to a minimum. If this presumption stands, the solution to improving China's trustee
fiduciary duty in reorganization dilemmas will be obvious and simple: China must retro-
165. See Ma Cunli & Su Jie, Po chan guan li ren ching xin yi wi ydn jif jiqidu! we gad po chan lifa de qi sbi
(1ff X 0RARI) [Research of Bankruptcy Trustees' Fiduciary Duty
and Its Inspiration to Chinese Bankruptcy Legislation], 7 ZHONGGUO SHANG FA NIAN KAN [CHINFSE
COMMERCrAL LAW ANN-uAL REVIEw] 443, 450 (2007).
166. You Bingning, supra note 142, at 34.
167. Id.
168. See DAVID A. SKEEL, DEBT's DOMINION: A HIsTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 113-134
(Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
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spect the completeness of the former transplantation. The conclusion of such retrospect
is undisputable, judging from the meager provisions.169 It is highly possible that the legis-
lature did not thoroughly examine all of the U.S. case law and scholarly literature on
trustee fiduciary duty in reorganization. The result is a huge vacuum area of trustee fidu-
ciary duty in reorganization after the bankruptcy legislation.170 Based on the U.S. case
law and scholarly literature, a complete and logical trustee fiduciary duty mechanism car.
be erected. As analyzed earlier, the tailored corporate fiduciary duty will be a reasonable
solution under reorganization trustee context.
Introducing tailored corporate fiduciary duties to the New Bankruptcy Law would pro-
vide a better guideline for incumbent trustees, potential trustee candidacy applicants, and
interested parties. A clearer legal framework brings better predictability. By increasing
the predictability of the trustees' liability, trustees' practice risk will be lower, encouraging
better-trained professionals to apply for trustee candidacy. Solving this major problem
will greatly ameliorate the dilemmas trustees face, although more compensation and des-
ignation-related legislative actions are imperative in the future.' 7'
VI. Beyond the Solution
A. ARE You PREPARED?
In 2006, there were only 4,253 bankruptcy cases in China.172 No official data has been
released regarding the number of reorganization cases. We do know that China has sig-
nificantly fewer bankruptcy cases than the United States; one can assume that this is the
169. See Zh6ng hui rdn min g6ng hb guo qi y6 po chan fa, (t9AR~fflMAREFM) [Law on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (China)] art. 25, 27 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006,
effective June 1, 2007), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-08/28/content 371296.htm; Zul gio r6n
min fa yuan guin yd shin li qi yb p6 chan in jiin qub ding guan li rdn bao ch6u de gui ding
( [Provisions of the Supreme People's Court
on the Decision of Administrators' Compensation during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases] (China)]
art. 12 (adopted by the Supreme People's Court, Apr. 4, 2007, effective June 1, 2007), available at http://
www.chinacourt.org/flwk/showl.php?file_id=1 17758; see also You Binging, supra note 142, at 34-3 5; Yang
Jian, sipra note 135, at 291; Weng, supra note 100, 138-40.
170. See Zh6ng hud r6n mn g6ng he guo qi yd po chan fa, ( [Law on Enterprise
Bankruptcy (China)] arts. 25, 27 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat' People's Cong., Aug. 27, 2006,
effectiveJune 1, 2007), available at http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2006-08/28/content_371296.htm; Zul gio rdn min
fa yu~n guin yii shin li qi ye p6 chan an jian qub ding guan li ren bao ch6u de gui ding
(J [Provisions of the Supreme People's Court
on the Decision of Administrators' Compensation during the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases] (China)]
art. 12 (adopted by the Supreme People's Court, Apr. 4, 2007, effective June 1, 2007), available at http://
www.chinacourt.org/flwk/showl.php?fileid= 117758; see also You Binging, supra note 142, at 34-3 5; Yang
Jian, supra note 135, at 291; Weng, supra note 100, 138-40.
171. The trustees' liability issue is the most prominent problem and needs to be tackled first. To focus
discussions on the trustees' liability issue, other causes of trustees' dilemmas will not be discussed in this
article.
172. See Gao Shangmin, Guin yi shin li qiyep' cban hn jidn zbi ding guan li ren de gui ding de l? jilyu sbiyng
AI[The Understanding & Application of the Provi-
sions on the Designation of Administrators During the Trial of Enterprise Bankruptcy Cases], 5 REN MIN St
FA [PEOPLE JUSTICE] 23, 24 (2007) (China).
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same for reorganization cases.173 With so few reorganization cases, is the revision of the
trustee fiduciary duty necessary? It is probably not important in the short run, but it is
certainly important in the long run. The result of the following macroeconomic analysis
will demonstrate the necessity of the revision and explain the answers.
Since China pegged the value of the Yuan to the U.S. dollar to keep its exporters com-
petitive amid falling demand due to the global recession at the beginning of 2008, Chinese
currency has been under pressure due to the appreciation imposed by the United
States.' 74 Although "G-20 leaders [recently] declined to endorse a U.S. push to pressure
China to allow the Yuan to rise," 75 the Chinese Yuan has still appreciated by twenty-one
percent since July 2005.176 The State Council of China conducted a pressure test in the
first quarter of 2010 to study the relationship between appreciation limitation and ex-
port. 77 The results showed that three to five percent of additional appreciation would
eradicate all profitability of manufacture-oriented exports.178 But since the pressure test,
the Yuan has already appreciated by three percent.' 79 Facing low profitability, many ex-
port-orientated enterprises stopped business expansion.' 8o Capital that was earmarked for
production has instead been invested in the real estate market, which is considered the
safest and most lucrative investment,18 resulting in the inflation of a real estate bubble.
This should be a warning sign to the Chinese economy.' 82 Some bubble pre-burst signs
have already been noticed by economic analysts.s3 If the real estate bubble were to burst,
many enterprise investors would have to seek bankruptcy protection.
173. The Fee Information and Collection System (FICS) contains data on 131,089 Chapter 11 filings be-
tween Jan. 1, 1989 and Dec. 31, 1995. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AOUSC) data
shows 129,304 Chapter II cases for the same period, excluding filings from Alabama and North Carolina.
Even if any number is divided by 6, the number of U.S. reorganization cases is far bigger than China's
bankruptcy cases in total. See GORDON BERMirrr & El) FLYNN, U.S. DEp'T OF JUSTICE, BANKRu~i-CY BY
THE NUMBERS 1, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public affairs/articles/docs/abi98febnumbers.pdf.
174. China-US Talks: China Vows More Currency Reform, BBC NEws, May 24, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/10143745.
175. Matthew Bristow, 'Currency War' Continues, Mantega Saysas Summit Ends, BLOOMBERG, Nov. 12, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aKjB7yyZo.41.
176. WangYong,Avoidinga US-China Currency War: Need for Rational Calculation, EAsT AsIA FORUM, Apr.
11, 2010, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/04/11/avoiding-a-us-china-currency-war-need-for-rational-
calculation/.
177. Du6 hit min chdng qi rdn min biyd lice shi ( [Multiple Departments Reacti-




180. ChO k?ujid g6ngxing qiyi de zhuan xing wen ti(iIThe Transformation Issue
of Export-Orientated Manufacturer], WTOJos, Oct. 10, 2007, http://class.wtojob.comi/class95_22761.shtml
(China).
181. Gu Chun, Fdng di chan li rn Idi de tdi rdngyi (Sftf- : TMi1*ftf Z) [Real Estate: Easy Profits],
CREI NETWORK, http://www.crei.cn/files/20109/2010f9dl7cl3l1141726.htinl (last visited May 14, 2011)
(China).
182. Steven Mufson, In China, Fear ofa Real Estate Bubble, WAsii. PosT, Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/10/AR2010011002767.html.
183. Fdng di chan pho m jidn ru gao wi qi (M±Pi *' l2IfAAftM) [Real Estate Bubble Has Been into
Dangerous Stage], SINA REAL ESTATE NETWORK, July 7, 2010, http://news.dichan.sina.com.cn/2010/07/07/
181781.html (China).
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Export-oriented enterprises are still capable of making a profit so long as they can ab-
sorb the currency influence. 84 If they have successfully entered into a reorganization
procedure by then, many such enterprises could still keep their last hope to reverse their
firms' decline. Such a situation would lead to a boom in bankruptcy practice, similar to
what happened in the United States in the late 1980s.s85 With hundreds of thousands of
export-oriented enterprises engaging actively in China's real estate market now, a burst in
the real estate bubble would create the need for many qualified trustees to resurrect their
businesses.
Therefore, given the high odds of a real estate bubble burst, trustee fiduciary legislation
is actually a pressing issue. If China is lucky enough to weather the currency war and
avoid a real estate bubble, a sound trustee fiduciary duty mechanism probably would not
be needed immediately. But if China cannot weather the crises, ex ante consideration and
evaluation are always the sagacious legislative strategy.
B. SOLUTION'S SOLUTION: LEGISLATION PLUS A BRAND NEW METHOD-CASE
DIRECTIVE
Although we have already discussed possible solutions to complete China's trustee fidu-
ciary duty mechanism of the New Bankruptcy Law, there is still an essential issue that
needs resolution given the different legal traditions between the United States and China.
Great care must be given when transplanting case law statutes to a civil law country.186
First, the legislature should clarify whether Article 27 governs trustees' functions or duties
to prevent further confusion. Second, current problematic provisions should be replaced
by more specific trustee fiduciary duty provisions to overcome the shortcoming of over-
simplified and sloppily drafted provisions. The improved provisions should explicitly dif-
ferentiate between a trustee's duty of care and duty of loyalty. Third, the New
Bankruptcy Law should set the standard of review for the duty of care to the business
judgment rule. Last but not least, trustee immunity should be articulated to avoid
vagueness.
In bankruptcy, where there is legislation, of course, there will be efforts to circumvent
it.187 This is absolutely true in the fiduciary duty context. Given that the duty is a con-
text-specific one, it is impossible for the legislature to exhaust all possible application sce-
narios. In adjudication, there will be legal gaps left for judges to fill. Although in the past
decades China's legal reform achievements have been stunning,188 it is not a wise choice to
184. See, e.g., ANDREw' B. ABEL ET AL., 1MACROECONOMICS 498-501 (7th ed. 2010).
185. Skeel, supra note 168, at 221-23.
186. China falls within the family of continental law countries, also known as civil law countries, where the
main source of law is statutes and where judicial precedents have hardly any binding effect. See SHEN
ZONGLIN & BijIAO FA YANJIU, LVM F9P [RESEARCII ON COxAURATIVE LAw] 142 (1998).
187. Skeel, supra note 168, at 121.
188. See, e.g., Xia Jinwen, Dang dhi zhdng gud sif g?i gi chingjii wen diyu cha h) yi rin min fa yunim wii zh6ng
xin de fps xi 0 ftI M W] MO* ' f 0Za , QBM-MOfW lby'99 fi) [Contemporary China's Le-
gal Reform: Achievements, Problems & Solutions-Focus on People's Court], 1 ZIIONGGUO FA XUE [CHINA
L. SCIENCE] 17 (2010).
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leave excessive discretionary powers to an asymmetrically developing judiciary.189 This
legislation gap would invite inefficiency and corruption of the judiciary.190 But recourse
of flexibility and certainty is out of the capability of lex scipta. A new adjudication method
is currently being tested and developed in China's corporate courts.
Admittedly, case law is more efficient than statutes in reacting to the rapid changes in
the business world. In 2005, the Supreme Court of China mandated high courts to com-
pile a "Case Directive" and distribute it to the lower courts to unify adjudication stan-
dards. 191 This task is primarily undertaken by research departments of local high courts
and intermediary courts.192 The departments compile and publish periodical cases
uploaded to an intranet by adjudication departments.'93 Courts embrace publications
from the higher courts, as they set very important parameters used to evaluate lower
courts' judges' work with the "Double R Rate," which is the remand and reverse rate.194
By following these cases, the Double R Rate significantly dropped.195 Additionally, if a
case from a higher court is obviously unsuitable due to social changes, lower court judges
tend to rule inconsistently to reflect such social changes. Usually, some of these cases will
be selected and compiled as well for higher court reference.196 Although following prece-
dent is not stipulated by law, it is already a common adjudication practice in the Chinese
judiciary.197 Given the challenge of the recent economic reforms, most of the cases com-
piled are focused on business disputes.198 Although there are still disputes about whether
this is a trend towards de facto case law,199 it will greatly alleviate the inflexibility of statute
law. The optimal way to fill possible statutory gaps regarding trustee fiduciary duty in
reorganizations will be to periodically and specially compile the Case Directive with trust-
ees' duty cases. Organized legislation, supplemented by the Case Directive on trustees'
fiduciary duty, is the most comprehensive and viable solution to implementing the second
adaptation of trustee duty. After tackling the trustee liability issue, China's judiciary will
be better prepared for the potential wave of future bankruptcies.
189. See, e.g., Xiao Yang, Zh6ng go si f? g?i gide chengfjy?fa zh?n qi shi )
[The Achievements & Developing Tendency of Contemporary China's Legal Reform], 13 REN MIN S1 FA
[PEOPLE JUsTIcE] 4 (2007); see also Xia Jinwen, supra note 188, at 17.
190. See Weng, supra note 100, at 140.
191. Rn mn fa yuan di er ge wu niin g?i g6 ging yio (2004-2008) (
(2004-2008)) [The Second Five Year Reform Platform (2004-2008) (China)] (promulgated by the Sup. Peo-
ple's Ct., Oct. 26, 2005), available at http://www.dffy.com////.htm.
192. Interview with anonymous judges at Zhejiang High Court & Shanghai Fist Intermediary Court (Nov.
22, 2010).
193. Id.
194. Id.; see, e.g., Weng, supra note 100, at 135-36 (discussing how the evaluation effects judges).
195. Interview, supra note 192.
196. R6n min fa yuin di er ge wu man gai g6 glng yio (2004-2008) (
(2004-2008)) [The Second Five Year Reform Platform (2004-2008) (China)] (promulgated by the Sup. Peo-
ple's Ct., Oct. 26, 2005), available at http://www.dffy.com////.htm.
197. See Hu Yunteng & Yu Tongzhi, An li zhi dao zhi di nb gdn zhang da yi ndn zhpng yi win ti ydn jib
() [Researches of Case Directive Major & Controversial Issues], 6
FA XUE YAN JIU [LEGAL STUDY] 3 (2008).
198. See Interview, supra note 192.
199. See Hu Yunteng & Yu Tongzhi, supra note 197, at 3.
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